Indicators of Risks to Media Pluralism

Is the Cambodian media landscape concentrated and if yes, how strongly? How well does the current law safeguard media pluralism? Which are the greatest risks to a diverse media coverage that includes all voices, all viewpoints, including criticism of people in power? These ten indicators shed some light on the risks that independent media faces and which could put media pluralism in Cambodia in jeopardy.

Media Audience Concentration

This indicator is based on audience-related data and media consumption; we specifically used the data of CMRD’s media consumption study 2015. It is aims at assessing the horizontal concentration of audience and readership across media platforms. Concentration is measured by using the Top4 largest audience share for each media type.

 Result: HIGH RISK (60%)

 

Why?

  • The TV market is highly concentrated, as the major 4 owners represent an audience share of 78%. The Royal Group alone attracts 47% of the audience through its media company Cambodia Broadcasting Service (CBS).
  • The Top 4 radio stations cover 43% of the audience in Cambodia – which means a medium concentrated RADIO market. It is also the most fragmented with 8 of the 10 most relevant radio stations, reaching between 4-6% of the audience. This means they potentially have the same - limited - influence on opinion formation. Unlike the TV market, most stations belong to small businesses and independent voices, such as Mongkul Sovann, Sambok Khmum or the Priority Group (Tunle FM).
  • The Top 4 PRINT outlets reach 59% of the audience share, which means a high concentration. The print market is dominated by CPP-affiliated media outlets, with 3 of the Top 4 print media selected belonging to owners or newsrooms affiliated to the ruling party. While the exact circulation numbers are missing, these newspapers, as a whole, claim to represent at least 65,000 copies a day.
  • The ONLINE market is one of the most crowded industries of the country with 31 Internet Service providers licensed and 7 active phone operators able to provide online data plans, according to the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. These include two state-owned ISPs. It is still unclear which the top ISPs and phone operators are, therefore the concentration could not be calculated.
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Audience concentration in television (horizontal) 
Percentage:   78%
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. 
Audience concentration in Radio (horizontal) 
Percentage: 43%
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. 
Audience concentration in print (horizontal) 
Percentage:  59%
If within one country the major 4 Owners have a readership share below 25%.If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a readership share above 50%. 
Audience concentration in Internet (horizontal) 
Percentage: not assessed
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%. If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. 

Media Market Concentration

This indicator aims to assess the horizontal concentration in the media market based on market share which illustrates the economic power of companies/ groups. Concentration is measured for each media sector by adding the market shares of the major owners in the sector.

Result:

Economic data was not available as a) market share and b) per media sector. Thus the market concentration could not be assessed.

Score:

LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
Media market concentration in television (horizontal): This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the TV media sector. 
Percentage: not assessed    
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. 
Media market concentration in radio (horizontal) : This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the Radio media sector.    
Percentage: not assessed    
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share below 25%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share between 25% and 49%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have an audience share above 50%. 
Media market concentration in newspapers (horizontal) : This indicator aims to assess the concentration of ownership within the print  sector.
Percentage: not assessed    
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%. 
Media market concentration in Internet Content Providers 
Percentage: not assessed    
If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share below 25%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share between 25% and 49%.  If within one country the major 4 owners (Top4) have a market share above 50%.  

Regulatory Safeguards: Media Ownership Concentration

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards - sector-specific and/or competition law - against a high horizontal concentration ownership and/or control. Horizontal media concentration means ownership concentration of control within one particular media market (print, TV, radio, online). The regulatory safeguards over the different media markets are in the Cambodian case mostly the same.

Result: HIGH RISK

Why?

  • An administrative authority or judicial body monitors compliance the ownership structures. This authority, however, is not independent but under the umbrella of the Ministry of Information.
  • Media regulation laws only exist rudimentary.
  • Thresholds based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control exist to some extent but only for the print sector.
  • Enforcement powers such as refusal of additional licenses, blocking of a merger or acquisition and obligation to give up licenses/activities in other media sectors do exist. However, there is no transparent procedure based on objective criteria that regulates for which offences to carry out these powers. Thus, the main purpose of the media regulation body doesn’t seem to be the prevention of media concentration but the oversight on the development of the media market.

Regulatory Safeguard Score:

5 out of 19 – High Risk (26.3% Regulation)

 

Table summarizes all 4 media sectors   DescriptionYesNoNAMD

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds or limits, based on objective criteria (e.g. number of licenses, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue) to prevent a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in this sector?    

This question aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the TELEVISION/RADIO sector.    

 

 0/4

 

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with the thresholds in the media sector and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?    

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on media concentration.    

4/4

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

- Refusal of additional licences;

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

- Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

- Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture.    

 1/4

(only in print)

  

  

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    

This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media.    

High Risk (0)      

 

Total 

 5/16

 

Media MergersDescriptionYesNoNAMD

Can a high level of horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?    

This question aims to access the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector specific and/or competition law) against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the media sector through merging operations: 

- By containing media-specific provision that impose stricter thresholds than in other sectors;

- The mandatory intervention of a media authority in merger and acquisition cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

- The possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the communication authority for reasons of media pluralism (or public interest in general), that - even tough they do not contain media-specific provisions - do not exclude the media sector from their scope of application. 

0

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with rules on mergers and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)?    

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system.    

   0

Does the law grant this body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims of assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as; 

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition; 

- obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

- Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture

  0

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    

This indicator aims to assess the effective implementation of sector-specific remedies against a high horizontal concentration of ownership and/or control in the television media.    0

Total 

0/4

Cross-media Ownership Concentration

This indicator aims at assessing the concentration of ownership in the different sectors (TV, Print, Radio, Internet) (cross-media). Originally, concentration is measured by adding and weighting the market shares of the Top 8 owners across all sectors in which they are operating. For the Cambodian Media Market, the calculation was adjusted:

  • Since market shares are not available for the Cambodian media market, cross-media ownership was calculated according to the audience shares. As such, the results presented are not an indicator for economic strength in different media sector but rather for the potential influence on public opinion when considering all media types.
  • The Cambodian Media Market is small: only 8 media companies are even noteworthy. The number of Top Owners of originally 8 thus had to be reduced. For such small markets, it is recommended to work with the Top 4 owners.
  • The weightening of audience shares was based on the consumption habits for each media type (TV: 96%, Radio: 35%, Newspapers: 10%, Magazines: 12%).
  • Since consumption data for individual online news websites that could have allowed a cross-media comparison does not exist, the Online Sector was left out. The low number of unique visitors per day, however, would not have changed the result.

Result: HIGH RISK

Why?

  • The Top 4 Media companies are the Cambodian Broadcasting Service (CBS) (45,1%), Hang Meas (23,1%), Hun Mana’s media outlets (6,5%) and Angkor Thom Printer CO., Ltd, (3,7%). This adds up to 78,4% of cross-media audience shares, proofing a high concentration of media companies that have a potential influence on public opinion. This result is related to the highly concentrated TV market that gets attention by 96% of the population: Ownership in a popular TV outlet already means a notable influence on audiences (see CBS, Hang Meas).
  •  However, cross-media ownership in the original sense – as media owners expand their businesses across media sectors – does not exist to a large extent in Cambodia. Rather than opening new media businesses in different sectors – and thus involving in the timely process of applying for licenses – owners seem to expand their already existing media businesses in a single sector (Sok Sam Oeun, 2015).
  • 3 of the 4 Top Owners operate only in 2 media sectors. As online media content mostly is an online version of a print content, and independent online news websites as business models as such are rare, the risk for cross-media-ownership is further limited.   

Top Companies:

CompanyTVRadioPrintOnline/ISP
Royal Group (45.1%)xx
Hang Meas (23.1%)x
Hun Mana's media outlets (6.5%)xxxx
Angkor Thom Printer CO, Ltd. (3.7%)xx
Koh Santepeap Group CO, Ltd. (2.0%)xxx
Rasmei Kampuchea CO, Ltd. (1.4%)xx
DAP Media Center (0.2%)xxx
State Media (no audience shares)xxx

    Score:

    LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
    Percentage: 78,4% 
    If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share below 50% across the different media sectors.  If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have an audience share between 50% and 69% across the different media sectors.  If within one country the major 8 owners (Top8) have a market share above 70% across the different media sectors. 

Regulatory Safeguards: Cross-media Ownership Concentration

This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership between media types (press, TV, radio, internet).

Result:

There is very limited regulation that affects cross-media ownership, which is ultimately not preventing cross-media concentration. Therefore a HIGH RISK for market distortion through cross-media concentration exists.

Why?


In Cambodian Law, there is no cross-media ownership regulation.In Cambodian Law, there is no cross-media ownership regulationn. Enforcement powers such as refusal of additional licenses exist to some extent - but not across media sectors. There is no regulation that concerns the licensing process with a more holistic perspective: merger and acquisitions across media sectors are not monitored nor have conditions attached. Obligations to give up licenses/activities in other media sectors do exist. However, there is no transparent procedure based on objective criteria that regulates for which offences to carry out these powers. Thus, the main purpose of the media regulation body doesn’t seem to be the prevention of cross-media concentration but the oversight on the development of the media market.

Regulatory Safeguard Score:

2 out of 8– High Risk (Regulation: 25 %).

 

CROSS-MEDIA OWNERSHIPDescriptionYesNoNAMD

Does the media legislation contain specific thresholds, based on objective criteria, such as number of licences, audience share, circulation, distribution of share capital or voting rights, turnover/revenue, to prevent a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media?    

This indicator aims to assess the existence of regulatory safeguards (sector-specific and/or competition law) against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors.    

0

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these thresholds and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media authority=1, competition authority=0,5))    

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation on audiovisual media concentration.    

  0

Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

The variable aims at assessing if the law is providing a due system of sanctions to sector-specific regulation, such as:

- Refusal of additional licences;

- Blocking of a merger or acquisition;

- Obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

- Obligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors

- divestiture.

1

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    

The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the regulation.    

0

Can a high degree of cross-ownership between different media be prevented via merger control/competition rules that take into account the specificities of the media sector?    

For instance, cross-ownership can be prevented by comptetion law:

- by the mandatory intervention of a media authority in M&A cases (for instance, the obligation for the competition authority to ask the advice of the media authority);

- by the possibility to overrule the approval of a concentration by the competition authority for reasons of media pluralism (or Public interest in general);

 Even though the law does not contain media-specific provisions - it does not exclude the media sector from its scope of application

0

Is there an administrative authority or judicial body actively monitoring compliance with these rules and/or hearing complaints? (e.g. media and/or competition authority)    

This variable aims to assess if the law/regulation provides a due monitoring and sanctioning system for the regulation against a high degree of cross-ownership in different media sectors via merger control/competition rules    

0

Does the law grant body sanctioning/enforcement powers in order to impose proportionate remedies (behavioural and/or structural) in case of non-respect of the thresholds?    

Examples sanctioning/enforcement powers and remedies:

- blocking of a merger or acquisition;

- obligation to allocate windows for third party programming;

- must carryobligation to give up licences/activities in other media sectors;

- divestiture. 

1

Are these sanctioning/enforcement powers effectively used?    

The question aims at assessing the effectiveness of the remedies of the regulation.    

0
Total  2 of 8 

Ownership Transparency

This indicator assesses the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners as ownership transparency is a crucial precondition to enforce media pluralism.  

Result: HIGH RISK


Why?

·  

  •  Lists of license holders for TV and print sectors were accessible upon request at the Ministry of Information. A list of radio license holders was only available for stations in Phnom Penh. This register, however, does not include reliable and accurate information on the media ownership structure but only on the registered license holder. Consequently, the public cannot easily learn which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls a media company- since it is not even questionable that the government is informed about details.
  • Lists of license holders for ISP and mobile companies are available online. More information can be obtained upon request at the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.
  • Since ownership transparency regulations are lacking, law doesn’t enforce the disclosure of ownership structures of large media companies, which provides grounds for market abuse and concentration.
  • Media and telecommunications companies and owners are not transparent on their own motion: there was only a low level of active transparency on ownership structures; economic data such as turn-over/ revenue are held confidential. This impeded to rank the Media Companies according to their economic power/ stability at this stage of the project.
  • After contacting the media companies with questionnaires, around 26% (13 out of 41) responded and provided complete data on ownership ) and thus showed passive transparency. 12 outlets responded but didn’t provide the project with the relevant facts on shareholder structure etc. 16 media outlets never responded to the questionnaire.
  • Data was sporadically publicly available.
  • According to the research, at least no company actively disguised the ownership structure, e. g. through bogus companies
    LOW MEDIUM HIGH

    How would you assess the transparency and accessibility of data about the media ownership?

    Data on media owners as well as their political affiliations is publicly available and transparent.

    (Active Transparency)

    Code if that applies to > 75% of the sample

    Data of media owners and their political affiliations are disclosed based on investigations of journalists and media activists or upon request.

    (Passive Transparency)

    Code if that applies > 50% of the sample. 

    Data on political affiliations of media owners are not easily accessible by the public and investigative journalists of activists are not successful in disclosing these data.

    (Data Unavailable, Active Disguise)

    Code if data is available for < 50% of the sample 

    Regulatory Safeguards: Ownership Transparency

    This indicator aims to assess the existence and effective implementation of transparency and disclosure provisions with regard to media ownership and/or control.

    Result: HIGH RISK

    Why? 

    • There are no transparency and disclosure obligations for media companies – and thus no enforcement powers.
    • It is unclear how much information has to be disclosed to public authorities. There is hardly information on media ownership accessible.
    • Sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations could be theoretically imposed and brought to court – however, there has notably been no case.

    Regulatory Safeguard Score: 

    2 out of 20 - High Risk (Regulations 10%).

    Transparency Provisions (summarized for TV, Radio, Press, Online - max. score 5 per sector)DescriptionYesNoNAMD
    Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to publish their ownership structures on their website or in records/documents that are accessible to the public?     The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for transparency towards the citizens, the users and the public in general. 0
    Does national (media, company, tax...) law contain transparency and disclosure provisions obliging media companies to report (changes in) ownership structures to public authorities (such as the media authority)?     The aim of the question is to check regulatory safeguard for accountability and transparency towards public authorities.    0
    Is there an obligation by national law to disclose relevant information after every change in ownership structure?     This question aims at assessing if the law provides rules on the public availability of accurate and up-to-date data on media ownership. This is a condition for an effective transparency.    0
    Are there any sanctions in case of non-respect of disclosure obligations?     This question aims at assessing if the law on media ownership transparency can be enforced through the application of sanctions.     0
    Do the obligations ensure that the public knows which legal or natural person effectively owns or controls the media company?     This question aim at assessing the effectiveness of the laws that deal with media ownership transparency and if they succeed in disclosing the real owners of the media outlets.    Medium: some owners are still unknown (=0,5*4)
    Total2 out of 20 

    (Political) Control Over Media Outlets and Distribution Networks

    This indicator aims to assess the risk of political affiliations and control over media and distribution networks. It examines the transparency of data about the political affiliations of media owners, the proportion of specific political affiliation of media owners across the media market in terms of audience share. It also assesses the level of discrimination by politically affiliated media distribution networks. Discriminatory actions would for example include unfavorable pricing and posing barriers to media accessing the distribution channel. Political Affiliations means that the media outlet or company belongs to a party, a partisan group, a party leader or a clearly partisan person.

    Result: MEDIUM RISK

    Why?

    • In the PRINT sector, distribution network means the logistics to distribute newspapers, which are not under political control.
    • CABLE TELEVISION (originally called CATV or community antenna television) was developed in the late 1940's for communities unable to receive TV signals because of terrain or distance from TV stations. A cable system is not permitted to carry a commercial station without the station's consent.  Stations electing must carry status are considered too have given their consent.  Therefore, if the local commercial television station elects retransmission consent, the cable system must obtain that station's consent prior to carrying or transmitting its signal.
    • The national RADIO network transmitting the FM signal in each relay on 87.5 - 108 MHz frequency range for each station, giving up to 1200 W of output power in continuous service. In order to operate and use this distribution network, a radio broadcaster needs to obtain a license from the Ministry of the information
    • An Internet Service Provider (ISP) provides access to the Internet and other related services such as Web site building and virtual hosting. More recently, wireless Internet service providers or WISPs have emerged that offer Internet access through wireless LAN or wireless broadband networks. Only when granted a license by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPTC), ISPs have the equipment and the telecommunication line access required to have a point-of-presence on the Internet for a specific geographic area.
    LOW  MEDIUM HIGH 
    What is the share  media owned by politically affiliated entities? 
    The media having <30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.     The media having <50% - >30% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.  The media having >50% audience share is owned (controlled) by a specific political party, politician or political grouping, or by an owner with specific political affiliation.    
    LOW MEDIUM HIGH
    How would you assess the conduct of the leading distribution networks for print media? 
    Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.     At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.     All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions.    
    How would you assess the conduct of the leading radio distribution networks? 
    Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions.     At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.     All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions.    
    How would you assess the conduct of the leading television distribution networks? 
    Leading distribution, are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.  All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions. 
    How would you assess the conduct of the leading Internet distribution networks? 
    Leading distribution networks are not politically affiliated or do not take discriminatory actions. At least one of the leading distribution networks is politically affiliated or takes occasional discriminatory actions.  All of the leading distribution networks are politically affiliated and has a record of repeated discriminatory actions.  

    (Political) Control Over Media Funding

    This indicator assesses the influence of the state on the functioning of the media market, focusing particularly on the risk of discrimination in the distribution of state advertisements/ funding. The discrimination can be reflected in favoritism towards political parties or affiliates of political parties in the government, or in penalization of media criticizing the government. State advertising is understood as any advertising paid by governments (national, regional, local) and state-owned institutions and companies. Public Funding is understood if th he government is using public financial resources to ensure a pluralistic media landscape with quality media. 

    Result: HIGH RISK

    Why?

    • There is no transparency on how much state advertising the individual media outlets get. Public funding only goes to the state media (TVK, AKP, RNK).
    • The amount of direct profit of Cambodian media businesses itself is questionable. Where media is unable to build upon financial support from politicians, their financial basis is too weak to secure long-term economic survival. Beyond that, Cambodia is experiencing a trend similar to that in industrial countries: advertising is “migrating” increasingly to the internet and online platforms. Thus media businesses are suspected to be set up as a tool of business men to cross-promote their other businesses (e.g. by creating advertising platform).

    LOW MEDIUM HIGH 
    Is the state advertising distributed to media proportionately to their audience share? 
    State advertising is distributed to the media relatively proportionately to the audience shares of media. State advertising is distributed disproportionately (in terms of audience share) to the media.State advertising is distributed exclusively to few media outlets, which do not cover al major media outlets in the country. 
    How would you assess the rules of distribution of state advertising?    
    State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on transparent rules.     State advertising is distributed to media outlets based on a set of rules but it is unclear whether they are transparent.     There are no rules regarding distribution of state advertising to media outlets or these.   
    IMPORTANCE OF STATE ADVERTISING    

    What is the share of state advertising as part of the overall TV / Radio / Print/ online advertising market? 

    VALUE: There is no data available on the share of state advertising in the market. 

    Share of state advertising is <5% of the overall market.    Share of state advertising is 5%-10% of the overall market.     Share of state advertising is > 10% of the overall market. 

    (Political) Control Over News Agencies

    This indicator aims to assess the range and independence of competing news agencies, including the assessment of the level of state ownership and level of independence (content-wise and economically) of state owned news agencies.

    Result: HIGH RISK

    Why?

    Even if financial information on the news agency market is lacking and the indicator could only be partly evaluated, it overall shows a HIGH RISK. Even if international news agencies are a relevant source for media outlets, the only news agency with a primarily national focus and with direct access to political information is a government service. AKP is the only state-owned Cambodian news agency. Other news agencies are foreign and include (but are not limited to) Agence France Presse (AFP), Kyodo News, Xinhua, Reuters, Associated Press etc. In this case “largest news agency” refers to AKP, the only Cambodian news agency. However, there is no data on which news agency – including the international ones – reaches out to most journalists

    LOWMEDIUMHIGH

    What is the market share of the leading news agency?

    VALUE: There is no market share for news agencies available.    

    No news agency dominates the market (occupy >30% of the market of news agencies).  One news agency has <50% ≥30% share of the market of news agencies.  The leading news agency has ≥50% market share.    
    How would you evaluate the political affiliation and/or dependence of the largest news agency? 
    None of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy.     At least one of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy.     Most or all of the largest news agencies is dependent on political groupings in terms of ownership, affiliation of key personnel or editorial policy.